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Abstract 
 
Since the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, many Parties to the Protocol have shifted 
their domestic policies into high gear to achieve the quantitative reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
undertaken for the period from 2008 to 2012. While the basic design of environmental taxation in 
European countries has received widespread attention, its actual performance has not been 
systematically assessed. This report aims at examining, against pre-determined criteria (e.g. impact on 
costs and prices, competition and trade, environmental impacts and recycling mechanisms), how 
effectively environmental taxation systems are functioning. Most importantly, the report analyses the 
political dynamics behind these systems and how they have changed the ‘optimal’ tax design into a 
‘politically feasible’ tax design. 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
NORIKO FUJIWARA, JORGE NÚÑEZ FERRER AND CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
1. Introduction 
Since the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, many Parties to the Protocol have 
set their domestic policies and measures in full gear to achieve the quantitative commitments to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions undertaken for the period from 2008 to 2012. 
Among various policy instruments to meet the targets, taxation remains a viable option 
alongside permits trading. For example, New Zealand has decided to introduce a carbon tax 
from April 2007.
1 Switzerland has passed the carbon dioxide (CO2) law that requires the 
introduction of a CO2 tax if voluntary and other CO2-related measures turn out to be 
insufficient.
2 These recent decisions over climate change-related taxes have been influenced 
through the consultation process by precedents set in EU member states and Norway.  
While basic designs of environmental taxation in European countries have been widely and 
frequently referred to, their performance has not been adequately assessed nor sufficiently fed 
back into the policy-making process. This report aims at re-examining, against pre-determined 
criteria, whether and how taxation systems are functioning with the help of existing but scarce 
literature on post-evaluation studies, and analysing the extent to which the performance can be 
attributed to certain design features such as the tax base and tax rate. 
This report is organised into seven sections. The next section locates the debate over 
environmental taxation in the context of the EU and its member states. The third section 
summarises the theoretical merits of taxation while the fourth section checks the reality in its 
implementation against its theoretical merits. The fifth section sets out criteria for the evaluation 
of environmental taxes. Against the criteria, the sixth section assesses environmental taxation in 
the EU. The final section concludes with key findings and policy implications. Case studies of 
the EU and its member states are compiled in an annex. 
2.  The emergence of the environmental tax debate in the EU and its 
member states 
Traditionally, the European Union (EU) has mainly relied on command and control methods or 
public investment to rectify the effects of pollutants. Compared with other pollutants such as 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx) or methane (CH4), which have declined 
considerably in the last two decades, CO2 emissions have stayed constant or increased (Figure 
1).  
Taxation as a means to reduce pollution is a relatively recent development. The theoretical 
merits of environmental taxation, which will be introduced in the next section, have been 
highlighted by the OECD in a large number of documents since 1993 and in particular 
theoretical analyses by OECD (1996; 1997), and by the European Commission in repeated 
attempts at convincing countries to coordinate their tax policies in this respect.  
                                                      
1 See http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/policy-initiatives/carbon-tax.html 
2 See http://www.umwelt-schweiz.ch/buwal/eng/fachgebiete/fg_klima/politik/CO2-Red/CO2-
Umsetz/index.html 2 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
The EU treaty requires unanimous agreements by EU member states in the Council of Ministers 
on any decisions over taxation, including environmental taxation, which gives each member 
state a veto over taxation.
3  Member states fear that majority voting on environmental taxation 
may just be the beginning of member states’ loss of autonomy over other forms of taxation. 
Member states are weary – not without justification – that the loss of such autonomy would 
undermine the fiscal position.
4 Under these circumstances no proposal for introducing an 
environmental tax has ever found a quorum. A proposal for a Community level CO2 taxation 
was introduced as early as 1992 but failed to be adopted.  
Figure 1. Trends in air pollution in the EU, 1990-2002 (index 1990 = 100) 
Data source: Eurostat database. 
The intellectual works by the OECD and the European Commission have induced several EU 
member states to adopt such tax measures. These member states have attempted to induce others 
to follow suit, by sharing their experience and through diplomatic pressure. Consequently, CO2 
or other environmental taxation has gradually been adopted by other member states of the EU. 
Studies by Tews (2002) and Agnolucci (2004) analyse in detail the pattern of diffusion of 
environmental taxes related to energy and in particular CO2 emissions.  
This report also covers Norway in the analysis of environmental taxation, despite its being only 
a member of the European Economic Area (EEA).
5 Norway is one of these front-runners that 
adopted tax measures alongside other Nordic countries and the Netherlands.  
                                                      
3 In some policy areas EU member states retain control over policies. This is also true for taxation; in 
some cases harmonisation of tax bases and rates can be important in a single market with a single 
currency, and for cases of cross-border pollution.   
4 In fact, the EU has increased the importance of Community-wide environmental protection since 1973, 
and has even reinforced it. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 introduced environmental protection as one of 
its main objectives (Christiernsson, 2004: 6) with a strong emphasis on the need to integrate it into all 
Community policies (Articles 2 and 6). In addition, the EU Treaty cites the ‘polluter-pays-principle’ as 
one of the fundamental principles of environmental protection alongside the precautionary, preventive 
action (rectifying damage at source), integration (to all Community policies) and subsidiarity principles.  
5  Nonetheless, EEA member states – Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein – have taken on board some 
2,900 legal acts of the EU single market regime, and continue to do so (Emerson et al., 2002).  
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3.  Theoretical merits of taxation   
3.1  Theory of environmental taxation 
The theoretical basis for introducing economic instruments such as taxation rests on the 
existence of negative environmental externalities from an economic activity that are not 
incorporated into the costs of goods produced. The effect of externalities is that production will 
be in excess of the optimal quantity as prices and demand are subsequently distorted, giving rise 
to environmental degradation beyond the social optimum. This so-called ‘Pigouvian approach’
6 
to negative externalities suggests that taxation will provide a mechanism by which polluters de 
facto have to internalise the cost of environmental damage (Helm & Pearce, 1991: 7, 18) and 
thereby correct market distortions.  
In a perfect market with perfect information, environmental taxes could achieve the optimum 
social environmental target on their own if designed appropriately. In reality, however, this is 
difficult as the ideal Pigouvian taxes must exactly reflect the marginal damage costs of pollution 
in order to achieve an environmental target. The accurate setting of an optimal tax level depends 
on accurate information regarding the actual damage costs and the benefits of associated goods 
being produced. Uncertainty about the actual damage costs associated with certain pollutants 
(e.g. to tax carbon emissions from power stations) led to a number of proxy solutions (e.g. to tax 
carbon-producing fuels, to tax emissions on an installation basis, to tax the output of electricity) 
(Helm & Pearce, 1991: 18; EEA, 2000: 20; Turner et al., 1994; 166, 170). 
The problem of imperfect information is particularly acute in evaluating the damage caused by 
carbon emissions and calculating the appropriate carbon tax rate. Among the sources of high 
uncertainties in estimating the abatement costs are the price elasticity of resource (e.g. fossil 
fuel) use in response to alternative taxes on carbon (see section 5.2), and the rate of 
technological progress.   
3.2  Advantages of taxation over regulation  
Environmental taxation is one of a number of instruments used to correct market failures. 
Traditionally, market failures have been addressed by regulatory controls, commonly described 
as ‘command and control measures’.  
In fact, regulation is often the preferred approach by governments to environmental 
management mainly for reasons of effectiveness. It is generally perceived that regulation offers 
better protection than taxation since the environmental objectives are clearly specified in terms 
of physical limits that cannot be exceeded and the technology to reach such objectives is often 
prescribed. This preference also reflects the important role that engineers played in 
environmental decision-making (Potier, 1996). Another reason for politicians to prefer 
regulation was its ability to hide full costs and their distribution, avoiding difficult debates on 
equity. Regulators’ (i.e. governments’) preferences have been mirrored by regulated firms’ 
preferences, which have for a long time seen environmental regulation as a cost factor and have 
chosen to minimise the costs of complying with command-and-control regulations. Firms relied 
primarily on problem avoidance and risk management rather than exploiting opportunities in the 
form of markets for new products and processes or gaining a competitive advantage from 
environmental decisions (Reinhard, 2000). As long as the costs of environmental protection 
remained relatively limited and/or exposure to international competition was low, there was 
                                                      
6 A Pigouvian tax is a tax levied on an agent causing an environmental externality (environmental 
damage) as an incentive to avert or mitigate such damage. 4 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
little need for other instruments that could provide better incentives to exploit the opportunities 
of environmental legislation. Yet the governments have started recognising the limits of 
regulatory approaches while realising the potential of markets in environmental management. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, not the least due to increased international competition and a 
general trend towards preference for  ‘markets’, economists, politicians and businesses 
(especially in OECD member states) became interested in a regulatory reform of environmental 
policies, introducing a shift towards the increased use of incentive-based and fiscal or economic 
instruments (OECD, 1996; OECD, 1997) and voluntary agreements (Storey, 1996). More 
recently, tradable permit schemes were added to the environmental tool box. See Box 1.  
 
Box 1. Typology of incentive-based instruments 
•  Charges or taxes set a price on pollution.  
•  Deposit refund systems levy a surcharge on the price of potentially polluting products. The 
payment of surcharge is refunded to the payer when the product is returned.  
•  Cap-and-trade emissions trading schemes set a limit on emissions from a certain product or 
process.  Emitters hold users’ rights for all allowances under the ceiling.   
•  Baseline-and-credit or simply credit-based schemes are another variant of emissions trading. In 
this case, emitters have to earn credits by over-complying with the target.   
•  Subsidies cover forms of financial assistance to provide the polluter with incentives to alter its 
behaviour. Subsidies can take the form of grants, soft loans, tax allowances or R&D subsidies.  
•  Subsidy reform aims at reducing the distorting effects of government policy that keeps pollution 
control costs artificially low through direct subsidies or tax incentives.
a 
•  On grounds of environmental liability, the public or private law requires polluters to compensate 
for the damage they have done.
b 
•  Voluntary agreements  include many different approaches including codes of conducts and 
responsible care programmes, voluntary measures such as voluntary restraint agreements or 
unilateral commitments, implementation of (accredited) environmental management systems (e.g. 
European Environmental Management Systems), voluntary auditing, voluntary environmental 
reporting as well as more formalised negotiated agreements.  
•  Renewable energy quotas constitute obligations to either produce (if targeted at electricity 
producers), supply (if targeted at electricity suppliers) or consume (if targeted at electricity 
consumers) a set amount of electricity produced from renewable sources. This instrument is 
increasingly linked to tradable permit schemes.  
•  Green government purchasing attempts to create markets for more environmentally friendly (i.e. 
green) products. Similar to renewable energy quotas, it aims at overcoming market barriers to 
entry of environmental beneficial products.  
•  Information programmes play an indispensable role in the successful application of incentive-
based instruments. Examples of such instruments include energy-efficiency labelling 
requirements, eco-labels as well as freedom of information acts, environmental management 
systems and environmental impact assessments.  
 
a See OECD (2000). 
b The claim for compensation can be justified where both conditions are met: the source of the damage can be 
easily identified and the damage can be easily assessed. 
Source: Egenhofer (2003) (based on OECD, 1994; OECD 2000; Clinch, 2000; and Stavins, 2001). 
 
Taxes offer a number of potential advantages over regulation and other incentive-based 
schemes. First is operational simplicity. Taxes, if properly implemented, can reduce 
administrative and transaction costs relative to traditional regulatory approaches.  Second, 
taxation is expected to provide an incentive for further emissions reductions which mean cost 
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the cheapest way of reducing pollution.  Third, taxes have advantages regarding dynamic 
efficiency. Regulatory controls do not send a market signal to facilitate research for abatement 
technologies or increased efficiency. Taxes are expected to encourage technological change 
(e.g. EEA, 2000: 15) and therefore can stimulate innovation, leading to new technologies, 
processes and products. The second form of dynamic efficiency is that taxes can enhance the 
exit and entry of firms through changing relative factor prices, and in so doing induce large-
scale structural changes in production and consumption (ECOTEC, 2001). Fourth and lastly, 
taxes provide the government with revenues. Details will follow in sections 4.1 and 4.2.  
4.  Environmental taxation in practice 
4.1  Definitions and evidences  
Existing literature distinguishes between taxes and charges. ‘Taxes’ refer to revenues going to 
the general budget and ‘charges’ to those that are earmarked for specific purposes. In practice, 
however both terms have been used without clear distinction and interchangeably. For the most 
part, the term ‘taxes’ is used to cover both taxes and charges (EEA, 2000: 19). In some 
instances, the literature uses ‘levies’, which refer to both ‘taxes’ and ‘charges’ (ECOTEC, 
2001). The OECD/Eurostat
7 identifies earmarked revenues with ‘unrequited’ payments, (i.e. 
taxes) and those being recycled or used for purposes related to the charge base are interpreted as 
charges. OECD (2001) adopts a distinction without reference to earmarking: ‘taxes’ are 
unrequited in the sense that benefits provided by government to taxpayers are not normally in 
proportion to their payments while ‘fees’ and ‘charges’ are requited payments to the 
government and levied more or less in proportion to services provided. This report may refer to 
taxes and charges interchangeably. 
Environmental taxes or charges may be targeted at either consumers or producers. In both cases, 
taxes create incentives for both consumers and producers by changing relative prices.  However, 
they exhibit different implications for distributional impacts (see section 5.4), competitiveness 
and effectiveness (see section 5.3).  
Charges and taxes can aim at either emissions or products. The main operational field of 
environmental taxes include energy, transport or pollution taxes and taxes on natural resources 
(other than energy). The main tax base consists of fuel, wastewater, emissions, packaging (EEA, 
2000: 19-21). This report mainly focuses on taxes used by EU member states to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, e.g. carbon taxes, energy taxes,
8 taxes on process emissions 
such as N2O.  
In addition there is a strong potential to reduce greenhouse gases by taxing non-CO2 GHG 
sources. The OECD (2001: 119) lists those that are the best candidates: 
•  CH4 from modern landfills; 
•  CH4 emissions from natural gas and oil production; 
•  N2O from use of fertilisers (with the tax placed at point of production or sale); 
                                                      
7 Eurostat is the EU’s statistical body. Select ‘Energy and Environment’ at: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/. 
8 For the European Commission’s data on excise duty for energy products and electricity from January 
2005, see: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/resources/documents/excise_duties-
part_II_energy_products-en.pdf. For the 2003 revenue from excise duty on mineral oils, see: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/resources/documents/excise_duties_energy_products_e
n.pdf. The EU data are also available from following databases: 
http://www.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/index.htm and http://www.economicinstruments.com/. 6 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
•  HFCs (and some PFCs) that are used as Ozone Depleting Substance replacements; and 
•  SF6 during magnesium production. 
An intervention in these sources of non-CO2 GHGs would assist reducing the greenhouse 
effects. For some of these products, however, the OECD (2001: 121) considers that market 
mechanisms alone are not sufficient, i.e. PFC, HSF and SF6 and regulatory measures should also 
be introduced. 
True environmental taxes and charges – where these are intended as offering environmental 
incentives rather than simply applied as revenue-raising instruments – accounted for only a very 
small percentage (6.5% in 2001) of total tax revenues in the EU member states. Out of the 
environmental tax revenue, 2.6% came from pollution and resources taxes, i.e. charges on 
emissions (e.g. NOx), chemical substances, products, waste (e.g. landfill) and natural resources. 
Energy-related revenues accounted for 77% of environmental tax revenues in the EU-15 while 
transport-related revenues for 21% (Johansson & Schmidt-Faber, 2003; European Commission, 
2005). Even though the share of pollution taxes in total tax revenues had been growing slowly 
(EEA, 2000: 24), the share of environmental taxes in total tax revenues had remained small.   
A critical element is the definition of beneficiaries (e.g. enterprises or production processes) that 
are eligible for tax exemptions or rate reductions, and the kind of exemptions or rate reductions 
that should be granted to these beneficiaries. The definition of beneficiaries touches several 
conflicting objectives of taxation, such as mitigation of competitiveness impacts, environmental 
effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and legal and administrative requirements (Kohlhaas, 2003).  
4.2  Fiscal neutrality, double dividends, and revenue recycling 
In most cases, environmental taxes have been introduced as ‘fiscally neutral’, i.e. new 
environmental taxes were offset by a decrease in existing taxes such as labour taxes and social 
contributions (EEA, 2000: 20). Together as a package, this was often described as the double-
dividend thesis; the ‘first dividend’ refers to environmental improvements while the ‘second 
dividend’ is usually interpreted as an increase in employment through reductions in labour 
taxes. Lower labour taxes or social contributions were expected as a means to improve 
macroeconomic policy. At the same time, commitment to fiscal neutrality was also fuelled by a 
desire to overcome political opposition mainly from industry, which was loathe to assume any 
new tax burdens. This double-dividend hypothesis has never been empirically proven (Carraro 
& Siniscalco, 1996; EEA, 2000: 16-17; Box 6 in O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 63; de Kam, 2002: 
19; and Babiker et al., 2002).  
The ‘fiscal neutrality approach’ often opened the door to stakeholders’ lobbying for generous 
exemptions with sometimes adverse effects on environmental effectiveness. In many cases, this 
ignored the polluter-pays principle and generally it deprived governments of revenue to 
compensate for possible distributional or competitiveness effects that would have occurred 
nonetheless (O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 63).  
Revenue recycling can also increase acceptability and alleviate competitiveness concerns. One 
common form of recycling has been provision of tax refunds (de Kam, 2002: 22). Another 
approach has been targeted spending programmes,
9 i.e. earmarking funds for specific purposes 
(de Kam, 2002: 22). In some cases, revenues were used for subsidies to generate environmental 
benefits (e.g. households’ energy-saving investment). One such example was the UK Climate 
                                                      
9 For example, direct subsidies for energy saving, pollution-abatement investments or R&D in pollution-
control technologies. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | 7 
 
Change Levy (CCL), which operates a number of programmes for assistance to business and the 
public sector (see section 6.3). 
The merit of recycling depends on the absence of government failure, i.e. that governments 
allocate and recycle revenues efficiently and thereby avoid distortions and/or significant 
transaction costs. Earmarking can become a source of efficiency losses just like the ‘fiscal 
neutrality’ approach, by attracting vested interests in receiving subsidies. Earmarking especially 
may lead to inefficient spending including over-investment which would not be financed from 
general expenditures (de Kam, 2002: 19; ECOTEC, 2001: 33). Moreover the parliament, whose 
most important power is control of the budget, has generally been reluctant to accept 
earmarking. 
4.3 Environmental  taxation in the policy mix 
Moving away from the traditional debate over which instrument is best, there is a growing 
interest in developing optimal instrument mixes. Now the centre of the debate is increasingly 
directed towards the question as to which combination of instruments is the most effective and 
efficient and the conditions under which the use of multiple instruments is likely to be 
preferable to the application of a single instrument (Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 14-15; Egenhofer, 
2003a: 57-64; and EEA, 2000: 17-18, 25). 
In practice most instruments are either linked explicitly to other instruments within a package 
(e.g. lumped together) or designed to work together with other instruments that have been 
created outside such an explicit package. This is because optimal designs of an isolated 
instrument can be more expensive than the theory suggests (EEA, 2000: 9).  
There are at least three reasons for which use of pricing measures alone is unlikely to be 
desirable (Brechling et al., 1991: 263-264). First, there is a general consensus that the overall 
price elasticity of demand for energy is low and that the level of tax rates on energy necessary to 
induce substantial behavioural change will be high – in most cases too high to be acceptable 
(see section 5.2). Second, the regressive nature of environmental taxes will have negative effects 
on wealth re-distribution, i.e. low-income groups are affected in a disproportional way (see 
section 5.4). Third, there may be various obstacles or ‘market failures’ which prevent efficient 
levels of energy-efficiency investments (see section 6.5). 
Taxes can be linked to standards, other levies, deposit-refund schemes, Voluntary Agreements 
(VAs), awareness campaigns, R&D, funds, subsidies and exemptions. Taxes and VAs can be 
used together either in a complementary way (i.e. implemented at the same time) or in an 
evolutionary way (i.e. one policy follows another).
10 Some complementary policies can target 
the same entities. This was the case in the UK where industry that had accepted a voluntary 
agreement benefited from a 80% rebate from the CCL (see e.g. Egenhofer, 2003: 42). Other 
complementary policies target different entities.  This is the case in the EU, where only the 
energy-intensive and power sectors are covered by the EU emissions trading scheme while all 
other sectors are subject to other regulations (see Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 25-27).  
In theory, tradable permit schemes – quantity-based policies – are incompatible with taxes (i.e. 
pricing policies) as well as regulations (which prescribe technology standards). Choosing a 
tradable permit scheme leaves no room for additional measures for a particular pollutant as it 
would undermine a firm’s freedom to identify a compliance strategy.  Nevertheless, taxation can 
be a stick to ‘entice’ firms to opt for tradable permit schemes, which they might otherwise not 
prefer (FIELD, 2000; Hasselknippe & Høibye, 2001; EEA, 2000: 9, 17; UNFCCC, 2002a as 
                                                      
10 E.g. Switzerland will introduce taxes where VAs are not effective.  8 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
discussed in Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 15; Joumard, 2001: 24). Firms may be more willing to 
accept an absolute cap and participate in cap-and-trade programmes if they are exempted from 
environmental or carbon taxes. For example, UK companies that have accepted to participate in 
the EU ETS (emissions trading scheme) are exempted from up to 80% of the CCL.   
5. Criteria  for  evaluation of environmental taxes 
Environmental taxes are in theory conceived to address an environmental problem and improve 
overall economic efficiency. However, introduction of an environmental tax is likely to have a 
number of implications, some of which would seriously affect the effectiveness of the tax. This 
section will discuss the economic implications of the tax in terms of various implementation 
issues such as barriers and political considerations. Ultimately, the environmental, economic 
and social implications of a particular tax will depend on the society’s willingness to pay to 
avoid the damage. Evaluation of environmental damage under uncertainty remains imperfect, 
and is heavily influenced by preferences of consumers, voters and an array of other social 
aspects. Unfortunately, existing literature is scarce on these implications due to a lack of ex-post 
evaluations – at least of environmental taxation in the EU – with the rare exceptions of Tews 
(2002) and Agnolucci (2004).
11 
5.1  Policy choices on environmental taxation 
This section analyses and summarises problems elucidated in the existing literature on climate 
change-related taxes, and in particular on CO2 taxation. For this purpose we first describe 
different hypothetical cases depending on the point of regulation: whether the tax is placed on 
the primary input causing pollution, the producer or the final consumer of the product. The 
following example of a hypothetical EU member state clarifies the range of available policy 
choices of EU member states for taxation on CO2 emissions.  
Case 1. A tax on the inputs 
Imagine a country in the EU that produces energy, using coal, the most carbon-intensive source 
of energy, as a primary input. The government calculates a cost to the environment for each unit 
of CO2, i.e. the most upstream case. This cost is introduced into an electricity price as a tax on 
the inputs causing CO2 emissions, i.e. on coal, fuel or other primary sources in proportion to the 
CO2 pollution they generate. As a consequence, each unit of CO2 produced in the country 
generates a revenue to the government.  
The first and direct consequence of the tax is an increase in the price of the inputs, raising the 
price of domestically-produced electricity and costs incurred by consumers of domestically-
produced or distributed electricity. For power companies the impact is clear: an increase in 
production costs, which is transmitted to consumers in the price of electrical power, and a 
subsequent fall in demand.  
The power market is closed 
If the power market is closed, i.e. not trading, the effect of the input tax would be a general 
increase in prices in the economy, as energy is a primary input for other domestic producers. 
The tax would in fact induce a behavioural change by consumers, seeking to reduce costs and 
searching for more efficient sources of energy, as relative prices of technologies change. 
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In the short- to mid-term, the power price change through the tax might have an effect on the 
competitiveness of local companies, and will be compounded by an increase in prices of fuel 
and other sources of CO2 emissions. In the longer run, investments to increase energy efficiency 
and wider use of renewable energy could offset any negative short-term impacts. However, 
transition to a more energy-efficient and renewables-based economy may be painful, and 
recovery from negative short-term impacts may not be assured. Imports of cheaper goods from 
other countries that have not introduced the tax might reduce the competitiveness of the local 
economy, and damage it. Moreover an increase in industrial activity in other countries free of 
the tax would offset the CO2 reductions achieved in the country. The government could use 
revenues from the tax and recycle them either for consumers, producers or both to mitigate 
possible adverse effects. But that would open a debate over wealth re-distribution on who gets 
what for what reasons.  
A closed energy market is rare in the EU, but may be found elsewhere.   
An open energy market 
If the country trades in electricity, the situation is more complex. If the country imports power 
and neighbouring countries do not introduce similar energy taxes, imported power would have a 
lower price, driving the local energy sector out of the market (e.g. the Nordic power market). 
Similarly, if the energy sector exports electricity, a tax on the inputs would increase the export 
value, reducing export demand. 
The primary impact on the electricity market through the input tax would be an increase in 
imported electricity, a fall in exported electricity, with the risk that the local energy sector 
would be severely hit before it changes technology, crippling its financial ability to develop the 
technology. The effect of the tax on CO2 emissions on local industries may be alleviated by an 
increase in electricity imports (if infrastructure allows), which leads to an increase in energy 
output abroad and thus CO2 emissions (unless they use a cleaner technology but then may not be 
so competitive). With this substitution effect, the tax would have little or no effect in driving the 
local industries to cut their energy use. This phenomenon is described as leakage. With leakage, 
global CO2 emissions might remain unchanged.  
The use of border tax adjustments (BTAs) or taxing imported energy is not possible in the EU. 
Moreover, the issue is highly controversial within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
(Brewer, 2003; Swedish Board of Trade, 2003).  
The input tax shows a similar effect with motor fuel. In the EU, without border control, this tax 
drives inhabitants at the border to refuel in neighbouring countries. The case of Luxembourg is 
very well known: citizens from Belgium, Germany and France near the border drive daily to 
refuel in Luxembourg, making the tiny country the most energy intensive in Europe. 
To protect local industries from the input cost rise, export credits or subsidies could be used, but 
this kind of state aids is not compliant with competition rules in the EU and is generally not 
allowed by the WTO.  
Case 2. A tax on the product – electricity  
As in the first case, a tax is imposed at source, but it is set on the output, rather than on the 
input. The tax will create a behavioural response by consumers, but again that will depend on 
the nature of the economy, especially the level of liberalisation.  
A closed power market 
The output tax induces a change in behaviour, reducing demand for energy. The impact of the 
product tax is nearly analogous to that of the input tax in this sense. The impact of the output tax 10 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
on industries is also similar to that of the input tax. However, in the long term, the tax does not 
assist the search for alternative sources of energy but only boosts the search for energy-saving 
technologies. This is because the tax is set on energy regardless of its source; thus energy from 
coal, nuclear, wind or hydro-electrical power stations has the same price. 
This is the reason why the product tax is less efficient than the input tax in reducing CO2 
emissions in the power sector. It is possible to design a system which differentiates a tax 
between energy sources without imposing the tax on non-fossil fuel-based energy producers. If 
such a differentiation is made, incentives created by the output tax to change technology are 
nearly equivalent to those of taxing coal or fuel. The output tax would not be directly related to 
the CO2 equivalent emissions per unit of input. A power industry that improves the technology 
by using coal more efficiently (and thus reducing the coal input) would not benefit from a tax on 
the energy output. 
For the government, however, the output tax has the advantage that it can easily target particular 
groups of consumers by exempting electricity producers or distributors from paying the tax on 
their sales of electric power to these consumers. This would allow the power industry to offer 
better prices. The problem with this approach is obvious. The more concessions are given for 
particular groups of consumers, the less behavioural change will occur. Industrial lobbies can 
successfully press for exceptions due to their importance to the economy. 
An open energy market  
The output tax has effects similar to that of the input tax, but it is easier for the government to 
address trade effects.  A tax break for electrical power exported or for power sold to industries 
can be introduced so that the power industry can offer more competitive prices to those 
consumers. 
However, the problem of cheaper imported power still exists. If electricity is taxed at source, 
then the tax cannot affect the foreign production. Any tax on the foreign product would be 
equivalent to border taxation as in Case 1. 
Furthermore, if the tax effectively reduces domestic consumption, this does not necessarily 
mean that the production of energy and subsequently emissions would fall. The energy not used 
domestically might just be redirected, increasing exports. Domestic CO2 emissions could 
therefore remain unchanged, thereby undermining the original goal of reducing them. 
The administrative costs of an output tax are higher than in Case 1, but still straightforward, but 
they can increase considerably if tax exemptions for electricity sold to specific consumers are 
introduced. A weakness of the tax is the lack of its visibility as the consumer is not taxed 
directly. 
Case 3. A tax on consumers 
Finally, a tax can also be imposed on consumers, i.e. the most downstream case. This is 
politically the easiest as it gives the government total control on who to tax. In economic terms 
and for the purpose of reducing CO2 emissions, however, it is the most inefficient.  
A closed energy market 
This tax, if imposed on all consumers, would be equivalent to the product tax in Case 2. 
However, this tax does not easily allow for tax breaks for sources that have low or no CO2 
emissions. Consumers generally have no choice on the energy source. Governments will need to 
find other incentive structures for shifts in energy sources.  
Another weakness of the tax is the relative ease with which the government can exempt 
particular groups of consumers from the tax or reduce their tax rates. As a consequence, large THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | 11 
 
industries with high energy consumption would be exempted from the tax due to their political 
power rather than real adjustment problems. The use of competitiveness arguments is common 
across industries.  
An open energy market 
In an open energy market, it is easy to eliminate practically all competitiveness concerns 
through these taxes. Exported energy will not be affected by the tax. Any competitiveness 
concern of industries can easily be addressed through tax breaks. Also any concerns about tax 
regressivity can be accommodated by exempting specific consumer groups from the tax or 
reducing their tax rates. As the tax is set on consumers, the source of the energy is irrelevant. 
Therefore, concerns about tax-free imported energy are eliminated. 
The biggest disadvantage is most likely the loss of environmental effectiveness. The tax will 
have no effects on CO2 emissions partly because energy exports may substitute for reductions in 
domestic demand, and partly because a large number of exemptions may be granted to private 
and industrial consumers.   
Administrative costs of the tax on consumers are higher than in case 1, but the tax is easily 
enforceable as it is equivalent to taxes such as a VAT. 
5.2  Elasticities of demand and tax effectiveness 
Elasticities of demand are very important for the effectiveness of environmental taxes. 
Possibilities for rapid and successful implementation of an environmental tax exist where the 
elasticity of demand is the greatest. The example of the Irish levy on a plastic bag is particularly 
telling. The overuse of plastic bags is related to consumers’ preference for convenience and the 
lack of a visible cost to the consumers for their use. The individual consumer has no financial 
benefit from not using plastic bags as these were provided free of charge. On the contrary the 
consumer would face costs of switching to reusable bags which can be easily used to substitute 
for plastic bags. The government of Ireland reported that consumption of free plastic bags 
reached 300 per person per year.  
The introduction in Ireland of a levy per bag caused a drastic and fast reduction at minimal 
implementation cost. Already a small charge on plastic bags triggered a significant reduction in 
usage as expenditure on these bags now exceeded alternative solutions, such as the use of 
reusable bags. The reduction has been estimated at 90-95% (Convery & McDonnell, 2003). 
However, as the study described, plastic bags have two particular characteristics that allowed 
for this outstanding success: i) there are easy alternatives and ii) there were no competitiveness 
concerns for the cost of reusable bags or even charged plastic bags is not sufficient to induce 
consumers to buy ones abroad (Northern Ireland in this case). 
However, this is not the case for carbon taxes. Elasticity of demand in the short term is lower. 
Energy is also an important input for large sections of the industry, and the use of fossil fuels as 
a basis of energy production is widespread. Investment costs of pollution abatement and/or 
reductions in fossil fuel use are often large. Alternatives to fossil fuels are generally more 
expensive or not necessarily more reliable.  
According to the European Commission (2000), energy users are proven to be responsive to 
price changes. In fact energy intensity in Europe over 40 years has been responsive to 
movements in the oil price (Figure 2). The figure shows that energy-intensity improvements 
followed price hikes in oil prices and the converse is also true, i.e. when prices fall, energy-
intensity improvements vanish. The European Commission (2000) thus concludes that the 
economy-wide energy use is sensitive to price changes. The IEA (2004) comes to similar 
conclusions.  12 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
Figure 2. Oil price and energy intensity in Europe, 1961-97 
 
Source: European Commission (2000: 169). 
That demand was responsive to oil price changes indicates the existence of an elastic demand 
over time. Hence a case is made for energy taxation. However, three aspects have to be 
mentioned. First, the elasticity of demand was caused by world price changes, and thus 
international competitiveness was not an issue. Second, a considerable adjustment occurred 
through output reductions and economic slowdown. Third, oil-price hikes have affected 
economic performance while only partially inducing a switch to alternative fuels. The European 
Commission (2000) explains this elasticity-of-demand effect by the price rises, and 
acknowledges that these oil-price increases disrupted the economies and are partially 
responsible for the end of low unemployment in European countries (European Commission, 
2000: 169), especially after the 1974-75 oil crises. The OECD (2001; 73) states that if 
companies were to operate in a competitive trade environment as price-takers, price increases 
due to taxation in their own country would lead to lower outputs and loss of labour. This is the 
reason for the need for environmental taxation at supranational level. In technical terms, this 
indicates that the scope for static efficiency gains is limited in the energy sector in open 
economies.  
However, the same European Commission document shows a strong correlation in the industry 
response to energy tax changes in Sweden for which no other explanatory variables were found, 
arguing that this is a sign of effectiveness of the tax. Figure 3 shows the change in energy 
intensity given price changes. Energy intensity deteriorates when the change is negative. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | 13 
 
Figure 3. Energy prices and industrial energy intensity, Sweden 1987-97 
 
Source: European Commission (2000: 170). 
This Swedish responsiveness to environmental taxes, which the European Commission uses as 
another example of price responsiveness (Figure 3), also needs cautious interpretation.  
Taxes on fossil fuels suffer from a limited elasticity of demand, which can be considered to be 
genuinely connected to difficulties with a shift to non-fossil fuels. In fact, as soon as oil prices 
fall, demand increases relatively quickly, indicating that alternatives are not equivalent in cost 
and efficiency. On a global scale, it is evident that the short-term elasticity of demand for fossil 
fuels is low. Data for crude oil demand in the US show a constant increase in demand during the 
years 2003 and 2004, and a projected increase for 2005 and 2006, despite a doubling of oil 
prices (see US Energy Information Administration, 2005). 
Underpinning these trends is likely the lack of viable, reliable and cost-effective alternatives to 
fossil fuels at the necessary scale. This does not eliminate the case for taxation as a means for 
reducing CO2 emissions, but means that taxation needs particular care to be effective without 
causing adverse effects. Special attention needs to be paid to the methods, phasing in and 
structure of taxation.  
Nevertheless, price differences have an impact in the longer run. For Europe the short-term 
elasticity of demand for gasoline, for example, has been calculated at 0.15. Only in the long 
term, larger effects of price differences are expected with an elasticity of demand at 1.24 
(OECD, 2001: 101). In the transport sector, different tax levels on petrol between the EU and 
the US seem to have had an impact on changing behaviour and improving technology. Price 
differences in fuel costs explain the 22% difference in CO2 emissions per kilometre between the 
EU and the US. The recent world price hike for oil has affected the demand of Sport Utility 
Vehicles (SUV) in the US and increased the demand for cars with hybrid motors.
12 
Price signals have also been crucial in shifting consumption of fuel from leaded petrol to 
unleaded petrol. The use of taxes to encourage the shift to unleaded petrol was very successful 
(European Commission, 2000: 172; OECD, 2001: 101). Here again, the success of the policy 
points to the readily available alternative source, unleaded petrol. 
                                                      
12 Standard and Poor’s, “North American Automaker Outlook for 2006 Marked by Weak Demand, Lower 
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Another example is a diesel fuel tax in Sweden, introduced in 1991 to stimulate the use of 
‘clean’ diesel. The effect was rapid with consumption of the ‘clean’ diesel increasing from 1% 
to 85% in just four years between 1992 and 1996, which reduced sulphur emissions by 75%. 
Similar tax-based systems aimed at shifting the consumption of diesel to the cleaner version 
were also very successful. There is no doubt in theory and in practice that price signals through 
taxation that change the relative prices between substitute energy sources are very effective. 
Elasticities and revenue-minded carbon and energy taxes 
CO2-related taxes, while having some impact, have not been as effective as taxes on other 
pollutants. The OECD (2001) indicates that the reason for the lower impact of these taxes is not 
only attributed to the difficulties of finding non-fossil fuels or improving technology, but on the 
tendency for governments to tax energy use in transport and households rather than industrial 
sectors. The elasticity of supply in transport and household sectors is lower than that in 
industrial sectors.  
The consequence is that a large proportion of energy remains untaxed, especially in these areas 
where elasticities are high. 
Unequal taxation of CO2 across member states would create distortions in the market, giving 
inconsistent price signals. In Germany, for example, the most CO2-intensive input, coal, remains 
untouched.  
Long-term elasticity of demand and technological change 
The previous section indicates that non-fossil fuels or improvements in the efficiency of fuel use 
are the key to reducing the use of fossil fuel and thus reducing CO2 emissions. A well-structured 
tax system with long-run price signals could provide an incentive to increase energy efficiency 
and create renewable sources of energy. This tax would then promote dynamic efficiency gains 
expected from the Pigouvian taxation. It is clear, however, that balancing the speed of 
adaptation of the sectors concerned with higher costs through taxes is not a simple task. One 
such attempt, which failed, was the UK’s fuel tax escalator. 
The UK’s fuel tax escalator – An elasticity victim? 
The UK’s fuel tax escalator was introduced in 1993, with an official aim to increase fuel 
efficiency. This policy was based on an annual increase in fuel taxes above the inflation rate by 
3% but was abandoned after protests in 2000. While the demise of the tax escalator has been 
attributed to the importance of pressure groups in society, a factor that influenced this failure 
lies in the lack of sufficient demand elasticity and of a convincing alternative to road transport 
in the UK. Parkhurst (2002) notes that the technological changes for improving fuel efficiency 
needed some years to filter through the car market. At the same time, however, public transport 
prices in the UK have also been rising above inflation during the same period, giving the wrong 
signal to society. Users understood the fuel tax escalator as a ‘revenue escalator’ for the 
government, not an environmental policy instrument because no clear alternative to road 
transport or fuel was available. This appears to be the consequence of a lack of attention to 
cross-price elasticities of demand, i.e. relative prices of alternative modes of transport.  
Nevertheless, while the UK government may not have implemented the taxes with due care, the 
tax fuel escalator induced the transport sector to increase its fuel efficiency.  
From the UK case, one can come to the conclusion that the design of environmental taxes needs 
to take into account the public perception of the taxes introduced. The lack of a coherent policy 
in the transport sector led to a difficult situation. In the case of the UK it was not possible for the THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | 15 
 
citizens to understand price increases in the public transport sector that clashed with the fuel 
escalator’s objective to reduce road transport.  
5.3 Competitiveness  effects 
OECD (2001) identifies fear of reduced competitiveness with one of the two major obstacles to 
the implementation of environmental taxes. Prospective losses of competitiveness have led to 
sectoral lobbies for exemptions or tax rate reductions.
13 The strength of these lobbies (e.g. 
organisation, networking, resources), fear of carbon leakage and concerns with widening 
disparities across regions have led to concessions from government. One of the main challenges 
is for the government to strike a balance between the need to create an incentive effect and to 
demonstrate sensitivity to competitiveness concerns in industry. The latter also means 
prevention of carbon leakage.   
The competitiveness effect on industry has been a major concern in the introduction of 
environmental taxes. Some aspects of this concern were mentioned in section 5.2. It is important 
that carbon or energy taxes are designed to produce the desired effects, which is to foster the 
search for non-fossil fuels or improvements in energy efficiency. To do so, the selection of tax 
method is crucial. Detailed studies determining when environmental taxes might entail 
economic losses or adverse effects are very important but difficult to carry out. 
In fact, competitiveness issues at a national level appear to be more important for CO2 
emissions. It is a very complex issue due to real global nature of the environmental damage. For 
more localised pollution, even a tax that reduces domestic production and increases imports 
would bring benefits to the environment. The tax aimed at reducing local pollution could in turn 
improve economic performances of other sectors and benefit the whole economy. Take the 
example of reduction in water pollution from domestic industries. Even if the industry were to 
close down and the product to be imported, the economy could gain in aggregate due to 
improvements in health and reductions in health costs or growth in tourism. Water quality at the 
Mediterranean seaside is an important factor for tourism, for example. With CO2 emissions, 
there are no gains if production is substituted by imports from polluting industries abroad 
(OECD, 2001: 75). Thus, the domestic economic effects would depend on policies adopted 
abroad. Taxing imports is not a solution, as we have shown above. There is of course the 
possibility of granting tax exemptions to industries facing competitive pressures from abroad, 
which would however neutralise part or all of the environmental effect.   
Difficulty in estimating all the possible implications might however lead the government to 
grant concessions where it is not required. The OECD (2001) considers that there are important 
cases where this occurs, undermining tax policies considerably as these exemptions usually 
accrue to the most energy-intensive industries. Furthermore, the concern over competitiveness is 
too often seen from the perspective of the affected industries, and not for the whole economy.  
Different rates of taxation for different industries give a distorted price signal. Pollution has then 
different values from different sources and might redirect investment into those sectors that are 
less taxed but in many cases are the most polluting. The OECD (2001) quotes the estimates that 
costs of abatement in Europe are 30% higher due to exemptions provided and that other 
methods such as wage subsidies (lower rates of social security contributions such as tax shifts 
used in environmental tax reforms) are clearly superior. The tax shifts can provide necessary 
public acceptance for the taxes but they will reduce pressure on affected industries to innovate.  
                                                      
13 For a cross-country analysis of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, see Kasa (2000) and 
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The idea that environmental policy undermines competitiveness is often based on a static view 
of competitiveness in which technology is considered exogenous (i.e. decoupled from 
environmental regulation). Environmental policy – with its dynamic effects such as inducing 
technological change, first-mover advantages in new markets or green consumerism – can 
indeed induce innovations in products and processes and then enhance competitiveness.  This is 
usually referred to as the ‘Porter hypothesis’.
14   
5.4 Equity  issues 
Taxes on energy are considered to be potentially regressive. The overall impact of the tax 
burden will depend on the incidence of the tax, the use of revenues generated by the tax and the 
indirect implications of the tax. A tax on energy has inflationary implications as a key input of 
the economy, although much of the existing literature is only concerned with direct burden of 
environmental taxation. 
More difficult to estimate are the behavioural changes caused by a tax and the burdens imposed 
after these changes have taken place. Behavioural changes are or should be the ultimate aim of 
an environmental tax, but they take place over the longer-term. In the long term, however, the 
tax may not be the only factor affecting such changes.  
In analysing the short-term implications before behavioural changes take place, it is especially 
important to pinpoint which sectors of society are hit the hardest and which will not be able to 
adapt to the impact of the tax. 
According to Hamond et al. (1999), equity implications have to be considered when analysing 
the effect of the tax on annual direct and indirect incomes for affected parties with and without 
behavioural changes (i.e. short- to longer-term developments). The authors are critical of the 
fact that most studies ignore a broad range of effects. The overall impact of CO2 taxes, such as 
fuel taxes, is not as regressive as some studies of direct impacts suggest. In fact, CO2 emissions 
are a good candidate for taxation on equity grounds and only regressive in a limited way 
(Hamond et al., 1999). 
In order to avoid weakening of behavioural changes and tax signals, the OECD (2001: 89) 
recommends against using tax exemptions even for low income groups, but rather to use other 
compensation measures. 
6. Assessing  environmental taxation in the EU  
This section assesses the performance of environmental taxes vis-à-vis five key criteria we have 
identified: economic impact, environmental effectiveness, recycling mechanisms, promotion of 
clean technologies and maximising economic efficiency.  
6.1  Impact on costs and prices, competition and trade  
Contrary to common perception, there is little or no evidence that environmental taxes have a 
negative impact on competitiveness at the macroeconomic level (OECD, 2001; ECOTEC, 2001: 
40; EEA, 2000: 51). Smith (2001) and OECD (2001) consider that these exceptions have no 
proper foundation. An analysis by the European Commission (2000: 174-175) shows no 
                                                      
14 Named for the American economist Michael E. Porter, who proposed that stringent environmental 
regulation (on the condition that it is efficient) can lead to a win-win situation, in which social welfare as 
well as the private net benefits of firms operating under such regulation can be increased. See Porter & 
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evidence that taxing energy-intensive industries would cause significant damage to most of 
these industries.  
There are at least three possible reasons. First, the current tax rates are either too small to induce 
an incentive effect at the macroeconomic level. Second, firms subject to international 
competition are exempted. Third, the targeted groups are not subject to competition.  
More importantly, according to theoretical and empirical literature, environmental policy is but 
one of many factors that firms take into account when making investment decisions. Empirical 
knowledge of country-specific relocation effects is very limited, especially in Europe.  
Existing empirical evidence of interaction between environmental policy and effects on 
competitiveness remains largely inconclusive (Scholz & Stähler, 1999; Ederington et al., 2003).  
6.2  Environmental impacts: Does the price signal created by a carbon 
tax cut emissions?  
Evidence mainly from practices in northern EU member states shows that environmental levies 
have positive impacts on the environment (ECOTEC, 2001; EEA, 2000).  
There are some cases where taxes have offered significant incentives for environmental 
benefits. Particularly effective examples of incentive taxes include the NOx charge in Sweden 
and to a lesser extent in Denmark.  
In other cases, environmental effectiveness of taxes is lower, reflecting the conservative 
designs, mainly to ensure political acceptability. The current rates of these levies are kept lower 
than environmentally optimal levels out of concern with political feasibility. They therefore 
failed to provide a sufficient incentive effect but served to raise revenue (ECOTEC, 2001: ii; 
EEA, 2000: 10, 19; Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 17).  
The exception is taxes on transport fuels. Fuel taxes such as motor fuel and motor vehicle taxes 
pre-date the environmental tax reforms (ETRs) – see Case Studies in Annex – and usually have 
been introduced for fiscal rather than environmental reasons. These taxes are not systematically 
related to environmental damage but have mainly been motivated by their revenue-raising effect 
(O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 19, 40; Jourmand, 2001: 23; EEA, 2000: 45; Newbery, 2001: 4).   
The environmental effectiveness has been further undermined due to – in some cases deliberate 
– design choices, such as the lack of differentiation by the carbon content of the primary energy 
in most EU member states (Joumard, 2001: 24). An example of failure of taxes to reflect the 
pollutant content of products or activities is the lower taxation of diesel than gasoline in the EU. 
The gap between excise taxes on diesel and petrol (gasoline) cars cannot be justified on grounds 
of pollution alone as diesel overall is thought to be more polluting than gasoline. Diesel releases 
even more CO2 per litre. However, as a result of higher efficiency of diesel engines, it has been 
argued that the overall CO2 balance might be positive (Newbery, 2001: 7; O’Brien & Vourc’h, 
2001: 7, 12; Joumard, 2001: 24).  The same example shows potential inconsistencies.  Annual 
motor vehicle taxes on diesel cars are usually set at a higher rate than those on petrol cars (EEA, 
2000: 47). A number of countries, including Denmark, Germany and Italy, impose 
differentiated rates of annual motor vehicle tax according to emissions characteristics (e.g. 
Austria, Germany) and/or energy use (EEA, 2000: 47-48).  
The environmental outcome is better in production differentiation than content differentiation.  
Environmental tax differentiation has been considered to be successful in promoting the market 
penetration of unleaded petrol (OECD, 1997 as discussed in EEA, 2000: 46; Newbery, 2001).  18 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
6.3 Recycling mechanisms: How is the revenue recycled to the 
economy? 
In addition to exemptions, revenue recycling has been the key to acceptance of environmental 
taxation schemes.  Hence, management of recycling becomes critical. There are examples of 
both governmental bodies and private organisations managing the funds to recycle revenues.  
The UK has developed a recycling mechanism through which the government will return 
revenues collected from the levy to non-household consumption (e.g. industry, commerce, 
agriculture and the public sector) partly through reductions in the rate of employers’ National 
Insurance Contributions and partly through schemes aimed at promoting energy efficiency and 
renewable energy. The government has introduced a scheme of 100% capital allowances in the 
first year for certain energy saving investments (i.e. Enhanced Capital Allowances Scheme). 
While promoting the government’s scheme, the Carbon Trust offers a range of schemes to help 
business and the public sector reduce carbon emissions. These schemes include grants to 
support R&D projects in UK business and academia, interest-free loans to small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) (i.e. energy-efficient loans), and funding for carbon emissions 
reductions in key industry sectors (i.e. the Networks Initiative).
15 
In expenditure £100m (approx. €150m) was allocated over three years from the Climate Change 
Levy (CCL) revenues to the Carbon Trust for the energy savings programme (Agnolucci, 2004: 
28). This amounts to about £24 million in 2001-02 and £36 million in 2002-03 or around 4% of 
CCL revenues per year (Pearce, 2005: 38). Pearce (2005) questions how far these expenditures 
take on board the revenue effect argument because the sums are too modest to secure long-run 
substitution effects. The effectiveness of the Trust in this context has to be assessed together 
with that of the climate change agreements (Pearce, 2005). 
It is important to note that there are a few studies aimed at evaluating initial effects (Agnolucci, 
2004; 27-28; Cambridge Econometrics et al., 2005; Köhler et al., 2005) and that consultation for 
the review of the UK Climate Change Programme has been undertaken in 2005 (IPA Energy 
Consulting, 2005; Carbon Trust, 2005). The evaluation and consultation with stakeholders 
suggest that changes will be possibly needed to the CCL.  
Revenue recycling in the Danish system takes several forms. Following the principle of fiscal 
neutrality, most of the revenues collected from CO2 taxes on industry in the period 1996-2000 
were repaid to the firms. About €600 million were recycled through a reduction in employers’ 
payment of social security contributions, about €160 million through special funds for SMEs, 
and about €240 million through subsidies earmarked for investments in energy savings listed on 
the agreements (Enevoldsen, 2003 in Agnolucci, 2004: 19). The law permits subsidisation up to 
30% of the required investment and created a special fund called the ‘Electricity Saving Trust’. 
The Trust has an annual budget of approximately Dkr 90m financed by an electricity savings 
charge of Dkr 0.006 per kwh levied on dwellings and the public sector. The evaluation of the 
Trust activities concludes that the scheme has been successful, given the finding that the 
electricity savings are assessed at Dkr 7.8bn or more than ten times the electricity savings 
charge collected (Rambøll Management, 2004: 4). In 1999, an additional refund of about €270 
million was granted to compensate for the re-distribution from energy-intensive to labour-
intensive firms caused by the reduction of social security contributions (Agnolucci, 2004: 19). 
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6.4  Promoting existing clean technology such as energy efficiency 
improvements in existing facilities 
Speed of development and diffusion of new technologies depends not only on the tax rate and 
market size but also on credibility of the tax for the longer term.  The designs of taxes such as 
revenue-recycling mechanisms and exemptions may have long-term impacts on the 
development of new technologies and/or the development of the industrial structure of the 
country. A key advantage of a carbon tax is the dynamic efficiency that creates incentives for 
firms to change production processes in favour of less carbon-intensive ones (OECD, 2001: 74). 
In reality, however, exemptions tend to ‘lock in’ energy/carbon-intensive or polluting processes 
and perpetuate harmful effects on the economy (OECD, 2001: 79; also see Jaffe et al., 2004: 17-
18). Even worse, an interview survey covering Finnish industry showed that no one representing 
the industry would give any role to electricity tax in either promoting innovations or in 
enhancing the diffusion of energy-efficient solutions. The survey concludes that electricity 
taxation in Finland has not had any major effect on innovation or diffusion possibly due to 
design of the tax and its low level (Hildén et al., 2002).  
6.5  Maximising economic efficiency 
One of the strongest theoretical merits lies in the ability of a levy to reduce administrative and 
transaction costs. Generally speaking, it is easier and cheaper to collect energy taxes than direct 
taxes such as income tax (Newbery, 2001: 3).Yet, benefits from cost savings can be outweighed 
by high administrative costs relative to the size of revenue and, more importantly, by the costs 
of revenue recycling.  Over all, there are little data on administrative costs of environmental 
taxes. And only very few countries have planned measures to reduce administrative costs 
(OECD, 2001: 91-92). 
The main question, whether environmental taxation and notably an environmental tax reform 
(ETR) maximise economic efficiency, remains unanswered, for there are full or partial 
exemptions to large sectors of the economy and in particular to those who emit most 
intensively. In many cases, therefore the burden falls on households (OECD, 2001; O’Brien & 
Vourc’h, 2001: 38, 53-56; see also de Kam, 2002: 20, 22). Often environmental taxes have been 
imposed on household consumption rather than production inputs.  In many instances elasticity 
for household spending, especially for low-income households, is low or even non-existing. 
Further complications can arise from the complication of design schemes to accommodate 
political interests (e.g. Pearce, 2005).  
7.  Key findings & policy implications 
The following conclusions draw together the findings from the previous sections. In particular, 
they relate the findings from the theoretical and empirical literature to the case studies in the 
Annex.  
The academic literature has identified a number of theoretical merits of environmental taxes 
such as incentive effects, dynamic efficiency and an increase in revenue. There is a wide range 
of modelling exercises. However, there is limited empirical evidence due to lack of ex-post 
evaluations, at least for the EU. And even if ex-post evaluations exist, they tend to be non-
conclusive by and large. One reason is that most taxes are recently introduced, providing a 
limited evaluation period. Another reason is that the evaluation of environmental taxes in their 
entirety is difficult as such taxes are usually part of a package with other instruments.  It 
remains difficult to identify the share of contribution of each instrument to the overall 20 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
environmental impacts. Nevertheless, taxes have been successfully used to induce product 
substitution, e.g. from leaded to unleaded petrol.  
In practice, the incentive effect of environmental taxes is often limited for three main reasons. 
The overall tax rate is too low to achieve substantial environmental improvement. Energy-
intensive industries in most cases are exempt or benefit from rebates.  And finally, taxes that are 
imposed tend to be directed to households, where in many cases price elasticity is low and/or 
product substitution – at least in the short term – is not possible.  
Taxes in general face three obstacles: i) overall price elasticity of demand for energy is low and 
in most cases the necessary level of tax rates to induce substantial behavioural change will not 
be politically acceptable; ii) distributional effects will create additional barriers because of the 
regressive nature of environmental taxes (i.e. low-income groups are affected in a 
disproportionate way); and iii) there are various obstacles or ‘market failures’ that prevent 
optimal levels of energy-efficiency investments. 
There is no clear-cut empirical evidence on the negative impact of environmental taxes, and in 
fact the literature seems to agree that industry’s claim on negative economic impact is 
overstated. In reality, however, governments have been subject to intensive lobbying by 
industry for exemptions or at least for recycling of revenues. In most cases governments have 
been giving in to industry demands. Exemptions and/or recycling of revenue reduce not only 
their effectiveness but undermine the simplicity of environmental taxes. While tax collection in 
general and collection of environmental taxes in particular, if compared to that of direct taxes, 
remain simple, the design and administration of tax exemptions and revenue recycling may add 
substantial transaction costs.  
The UK has developed a recycling mechanism through which the government will return 
revenues collected from the Climate Change Levy to the business sector partly through 
reductions in the rate of employers’ National Insurance Contributions and partly through 
schemes aimed at promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy. The Carbon Trust offers a 
range of schemes to help business and the public sector reduce carbon emissions.  
Should taxes be considered as a suitable instrument, in the case of the power industry, the best 
tax system would be taxation on the primary input, which is usually coal. The tax will increase 
incentives to use other sources of energy if possible, increasing costs of production with coal 
but not affecting costs of alternative sources of energy. The energy industry will gradually shift 
production of energy to other sources. The incentive effect directly aims at the power industry 
which benefits from improving technology to reduce costs. 
However, the main effect of input taxes is to be expected in the longer run, e.g. discouraging the 
construction of energy plants based on coal. Overall prices of energy will increase in case the 
energy price is set industry-wide. It is unlikely that consumers are directly paying for one source 
or another. The advantage of these taxes will be to motivate consumers and hence the economy 
to become more energy efficient.
16 The price increase will induce more energy efficiency in the 
economy.  
In addition, taxing the primary energy source does not allow tax differentiation between 
consumers. This decreases the likelihood that the effectiveness of the policy implementation 
                                                      
16 For the specific case of climate change, such a tax may generate unintended consequences.  Inducing a 
fuel switching to gas will discourage investment and technological development in clean coal 
technologies (e.g. carbon capture and storage), which are likely to play a central role in meeting the 
global climate change challenge. Therefore additional policies are likely to be needed to encourage 
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will be undermined through granting of concessions on energy-related taxes to industries. 
Nevertheless, the government may want to compensate some strategic industries for lack of 
access to exemptions or rate reductions through other tax cuts.   
Taxing the product or consumers would be less efficient than taxing the input as the former 
would dilute the incentive effect more than the latter. | 22 
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Annex 
Case studies of selective member states and the EU 
The following case studies briefly describe the key elements of major taxation schemes in EU 
member states.  Principal sources are ECOTEC, 2001; Egenhofer & ten Brink, 2003; 
Bleischwitz, 2004; EEA, 2004; OECD, 2001, unless references in the specific sections indicate 
otherwise.  
The use of environmental taxes started in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, 
followed by larger EU member states (i.e. France, Germany, Italy and the UK). It was 
accompanied by the exploration of the possibilities for introducing environmental taxes as part 
of comprehensive tax reforms, later dubbed environmental tax reforms (ETRs).
17 An ETR 
meant shifting the tax base by reducing taxes on ‘goods’ (e.g. employment) in line with fiscal 
neutrality but raising taxes on ‘bads’ (e.g. pollution, overuse of natural resources) (EEA, 2000; 
OECD, 2001; ECOTEC, 2001: 24-25, 33).  
ETRs combined new environmental taxes with reductions in existing taxes, such as labour taxes 
and income taxes. (For details, see Table A1 below and O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 62; 
Schlegelmilch, 2000: 7). Soon an ETR became a core ingredient of the sustainable development 
agenda, seen as a means to move the economy towards a sustainable development path with the 
argued benefit of generating ‘double dividends’ (see section 4.2) of environmental 
improvements and job creation. Table A1 presents an overview of the tax shifts. 
Table A.1. Implemented and proposed tax shifts in EU member states  
Country Tax  Shift  Revenue Shifted 
  From  To  (% of total tax 
revenue) 
Finland  1990  Partly taxes on labour  CO2 emissions   
Sweden  
1991, 1993, 1995 
(updated 2001) 
Reduction of labour taxes of 
around 4.3 percentage points) 
& social security contributions  
Environmental and 
energy taxes 
including CO2 tax and 
SO2 tax 
1.9 % (environmental 
&  energy taxes 18 bil 
SEK; 2 bil EUR) 
Denmark 
1992/3, 1995 & 
1998 
Personal Income, Employers’ 
Social Security Contributions, 
Investment Incentives 
Various (electricity, 
water, waste, cars), 
CO2 and SO2 
2.5 % 
(2.5 bil DKK; 340 mil 
EUR in 2000) 
Spain  1995  Personal Income  Motor Fuels  0.2 % 
Netherlands  1996  Personal Income, Corporate 
Profits, Employers’ social 
security contributions 
Energy and CO2 
Regulatory Energy 
Tax) 
0.8% 
(2.2 bil NLG; 1 bil 
EUR in 1998) 
UK 1996  Employers’ Social Security 
Contributions 
Landfill 0.2  % 
(450 mil UKL; 640 
mil EUR in 1996) 
                                                      
17 It can be also called ‘green tax reform’ (GTR) (OECD, 2001; de Kam, 2002; O’Brien & Vourc’h, 
2001), ‘ecological tax reform’ (ETR) (EEA, 2000) or ‘environmental fiscal reforms’ (de Kam, 2002).  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | 29 
 
Country Tax  Shift  Revenue Shifted 
  From  To  (% of total tax 
revenue) 
Finland  1997 
(updated 1998) 
Personal Income, Employers’ 
Social Security Contributions 
CO2 and Landfill  0.5% 
Italy 1998/1999  Reduction of Employment 
Charges  
CO2 on mineral fuels  0.1 to 0.2%
18 
(around 600 mil EUR) 
Germany  1999  Social Security Contributions 
(pension insurance) paid by 
employers & employees 
Energy (mineral oils, 
natural gas and 
electricity) 
0.6% (estimated) 
or a reduction by 0.8 
% points (8.4 bil DM; 
4.3 bil EUR in 1999) 
France 1999 
(suspended) 
Plans to reduce taxes on labour 
and employment  
Generalised pollution 
tax (known as TGAP) 
NA 
Austria 1999 
(updated 2000) 
Employers’ Social Security 
Contributions 
Energy and vehicle 
taxation 
 Up to 4.8% (up to 50 
bil ATS; 3.6 bil EUR) 
UK 2001  Social Security Contributions  Energy/CO2 
emissions under the 
Climate Change Levy 
 
UK (April 2002)  National Insurance 
Contributions 
Aggregates tax (sand, 
gravel, crushed rock) 
 
Sources: ECOTEC (2001), OECD (2001), Bygrave & Ellis (2003). 
Some countries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, UK
19) 
have formalised the ETR process by designating ‘environmental/ green tax commissions’ or 
inter-ministerial committees
20 (O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 21) to address design issues and 
likely impacts. Among others these tax commissions dealt with the possibility to contemplate 
the scaling back of subsidies for goods that have detrimental effects on the environment (EEA, 
2004; OECD/IEA, 2002; Varangu & Morgan, 2002; de Moor, 2001).  
a) UK 
The Climate Change Levy (CCL) was introduced in 2001. The UK government offered 
compensatory reductions in other taxes such as national insurance contributions upon 
introduction of the CCL. CCL is part of a broad policy package including voluntary agreements 
(‘umbrella agreements’), regulation (i.e. the EU Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, 
                                                      
18 See ECOTEC (2001). The 0.2% cut is based on total tax revenues of around €339 billion in 1995. 
19 In 1998 the UK government commissioned Lord Marshall to investigate the case for a tax on the 
business use of energy. His report published a year later supported the case, which resulted in the 
introduction of the Climate Change Levy (CCL) (Agnolucci, 2004). 
20 The government of Sweden appointed the Committee on Industrial Energy Taxation, whose findings 
led to the abolishment of the energy tax on industry and the reduction of the carbon tax on industry 
(Agnolucci, 2004). The 1998 Green Tax Commission appointed by the Norwegian government provided 
the basis for the later expansion of the CO2 tax base to exempted industries and the introduction of a 
domestic system for GHG emissions trading (Agnolucci, 2004).  30 | FUJIWARA, NÚÑEZ FERRER & EGENHOFER 
IPPC, Directive), exemptions and reductions, and the national emissions trading scheme (UK 
ETS).  
The CCL has been designed not to be a carbon tax but an energy tax and electricity is taxed on 
production (Newbery, 2001: 9). The levy applies to non-household consumption (e.g. industry, 
commerce, agriculture and the public sector) while exempting electricity generated from ‘new 
renewables’ and CHP. The government exempts household energy use from the CCL. The 
government has ruled out environmentally related taxation on private use of fuel and power, and 
maintains the VAT rate on household fuels lower than the standard rate (O’Brien & Vourc’h, 
2001: 60).  
One of the reasons why UK companies entered into the UK ETS was to avoid the CCL. 
Arguably the whole package, which is a key to the implementation of the UK Climate Change 
Programme, would not have been possible without VAs or the 80% tax exemption. Energy-
intensive industries could benefit from significantly lower tax rates if they agreed on targets for 
energy-efficiency improvements or carbon emissions reductions (i.e. an 80% reduction from 
CCL for the signatories of VAs until 31 March 2003). 
The success of the CCL has been attributed to an element of hypothecation to induce taxpayers 
to reduce their energy use, and therefore to reduce their liability to tax (EEA, 2000: 56). All 
revenues will be returned to non-household sectors. The levy is used to finance a range of 
measures to assist energy users to improve their energy efficiency. These measures include 
Action Energy (formerly the Energy Efficiency Best Practise Programme) involving the Carbon 
Trust,
21 the Energy Saving Trust,
22 and a system of 100% first year capital allowances for 
energy-saving investments by the private sector (i.e. Enhanced Capital Allowance Scheme).
23 
The UK introduced a fuel-duty escalator in 1993. The government applied a reduced excise tax 
rate on ultra low-sulphur diesel (ULSD) in 1999 and ultra low-sulphur petrol (ULSP) in 2000. 
Evidence suggests that the UK fuel-duty escalator has led to a decrease in fuel consumption by 
the road transport sector (EEA, 2000: 45) but was later abolished due to political opposition (see 
section 5.2). 
b) Germany 
Germany introduced a set of taxes as part of the environmental tax reform in 1999. The mineral 
oil excises on mineral oils, gasoline and diesel, heating oil, and gas were raised. An electricity 
tax was introduced. The second to fifth phases further proceeded with ETRs (2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003 respectively). The new phases increased mineral oil duty rate on motor fuel and electricity 
tax duty (Government of Germany 2003). Revenues from these taxes are recycled to the 
economy mainly by reducing social security contributions, especially those to the pension 
system. However, from the start of 2003 only 95% of the tax payments exceeding the (simple) 
savings of pension contributions are refunded (Kohlhaas, 2003: 10). 
Under the scheme fossil fuels used as inputs for power generation are exempt. Until the end of 
2002 a reduced rate of 20% applied to taxes on mineral oil and electricity for all producing 
business (i.e. manufacturing and mining) and agriculture and forestry (excluding their use of 
gasoline and diesel). The reduced tax rate on electricity, fuel oil and natural gas for 
manufacturing, agriculture and forestry was raised from the start of 2003 to 60% of the standard 
tax rate. 
                                                      
21 See http://www.thecarbontrust.co.uk 
22 See http://www.est.org.uk 
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The German government also provided energy-intensive industry with several partial 
exemptions from taxes on electricity and mineral oils (‘Spitzenausgleich’). In Germany large 
energy users whose payments on energy products exceed a threshold are able to pay only one 
fifth of the standard rate on electricity and of the tax increase for heating oil and gas. The tax 
rates for the manufacturing industry on electricity are phased in between 1999 and 2003, and 
doubled up to 0.41€/1000kWh in 2003 (Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 15). Industry will be reimbursed 
the amount of tax burden above the factor if their energy tax burden exceeds the factor 1.2 of 
the reduction in social security contribution.  
Preferential treatment (i.e. complete exemption or a reduced rate of fuel tax) is provided for 
efficient CHP plants. From 2002, efficient installations with Combined Cycle Gas Turbines 
(CCGT) are eligible for tax exemption. Installations with a rated burden up to 2MW are 
exempted from tax on electricity.  
Tax exemptions are granted for electricity produced from renewable energies.  
In addition the tax on electricity for rail transport (except operational transport within plants and 
mountain railways) or trolley buses and the tax on mineral oil for local public transport have 
been reduced to 50% of the standard rate (EEA, 2000: 66; Schlegelmilch, 2000: 8-9).
24  
Electricity used to operate storage heaters installed before April 1999 was taxed until the end of 
2002 at 50% of the standard tax rate because low-income households are the main users of such 
heaters. However, its environmental impact was questioned and only granted on a transitional 
basis. The subsequent law allows for an increase to 60% of the standard rate from the start of 
2003 and terminates the treatment at the end of 2006. 
The German tax has been very controversial during election campaigns. The new government 
brought in at the end of 2005 has no intention of changing these taxes, as the potential revenue 
shortfall cannot be compensated for.  
c) France 
In 1999 France introduced the ‘taxe générale sur les activités pollutants’ (TGAP) (general tax on 
polluting activities) by bundling 17 smaller environmental taxes on waste, water and air 
pollution together under a uniform scheme (see Table A1). The tax base was to be broadened 
and tax rates were to be raised. However, the tax was regarded as ‘unconstitutional’ in 2000 and 
the proposed extension of the TGAP to fossil fuel combustion and electricity generation has 
been suspended (OECD, 2001: 52; EEA, 2000: 65; Schlegelmilch, 2000: 8).  
Fuel taxes in France are higher than the EU average. In 1999, the government proposed to raise 
the mineral oil tax on diesel over a period of seven years in order to phase out a subsidy for 
diesel given its lower tax rate. Yet the plan was weakened by the exemption of long-distance 
transport through reimbursement.  
d)  The European Union 
There is no EU-wide carbon tax.  
                                                      
24 Press release, “Commission approves modified German environmental tax, including special rules for 
energy intensive users”, European Commission, 30 March 2004. Press release, “Commission approves 
prolongation of tax reductions from the German Ecotax after 31 March 2002”, European Commission, 13 
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The EU Energy Taxation Directive
25 sets minimum rates of taxation for motor fuel, motor fuel 
for industrial or commercial use, heating fuel and electricity. Energy products will only be taxed 
when used as fuel for heating not as raw materials. Member states will be allowed to 
differentiate between commercial and non-commercial diesel. Business use of energy products 
can be taxed at a lower rate than non-business use. Energy products used for international air 
transport will remain exempt as long as international commitments are in place. Member states 
can opt to exempt renewable energy sources and energy used for public transport. For 
derogations, member states are authorised to continue to apply a range of reductions and 
exemptions set out in the Directive.
26 
e) Others 
Denmark 
Denmark has developed a package of energy, CO2 and sulphur taxes. The Danish energy and 
CO2 taxes are among the highest in the world. The taxation on energy covers oil, coal, gas and 
electricity. These taxes are not applied to fuel consumption in electricity production but to 
electricity consumption (Government of Denmark, 2004: 4-5). 
In 1992, a CO2 tax was introduced for households and extended to industry in 1993. The energy 
package introduced in 1995 altered the taxation of industrial energy use: a gradual increase in 
CO2 taxation, a modification of energy taxation on industry, and the introduction of a new tax 
on SO2 emissions. According to fiscal neutrality, the marginal taxation of labour income was 
reduced by a total 2% of the Danish GDP (EEA, 2000: 59). 
In the new Danish scheme, CO2 tax rates are differentiated according to energy intensity of the 
process and the voluntary agreement (VA) on energy conservation measures (Schlegelmilch, 
2000: 7; see also EEA, 2000: 9, 29; Government of Denmark, 2004: 5). Light processes are 
subject to a slightly lower rate. Heavy processes listed are not exempt but benefit from a much 
lower rate. Danish entities participating in VA are granted a reduction in the energy tax rate 
from €2/t CO2 (€3.3 for energy-intensive industries) to €0.4/t CO2 in 2000. If VAs including 
energy audits are concluded, a further reduced rate can apply to heavy and some light processes 
(EEA, 2000: 59). This exemption for energy-intensive industries has to be repaid if the VA has 
not been met (Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 15, 18, 27; Schlegelmilch, 2000: 7). 
The Danish tax rates are differentiated over time as well as by industry type.  Innovations 
induced by taxes can also help to improve competitiveness (EEA, 2000: 15). 
Revenue recycling in the Danish system takes several forms. Following the principle of fiscal 
neutrality, most of the revenues collected from CO2 taxes on industry in the period 1996-2000 
were repaid to the firms. About €600 million were recycled through a reduction in employers’ 
payment of social security contributions, about €160 million through special funds for small- 
and medium-sized enterprises and about €240 million through subsidies earmarked for 
investments in energy savings listed on the agreements (Enevoldsen, 2003 in Agnolucci, 2004: 
                                                      
25 Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 
restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity’, L 283/51, 
31.10.2003; Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Council Directive 2004/74/EC of 29 April 2004 
amending Directive 2003/96/EC as regards the possibility for certain Member States to apply, in respect 
of energy products and electricity, temporary exemptions or reductions in the levels of taxation’, 2 June 
2004. The latter establishes transitional arrangements for the new member states that acceded on 1 May 
2004. 
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19). The law permits the subsidisation of up to 30% of the required investment and created a 
special fund called the Electricity Saving Trust. The Trust has an annual budget of 
approximately Dkr 90m financed by an electricity savings charge of Dkr 0.006 per kwh levied 
on dwellings and the public sector. The evaluation of the Trust’s activities concludes that the 
scheme has been successful, given the finding that the electricity savings are assessed at Dkr 
7.8bn – or more than ten times the electricity savings charge collected (Rambøll Management, 
2004: 4). In 1999, an additional refund of about €270 million was granted to compensate for the 
re-distribution from energy-intensive to labour-intensive firms caused by the reduction of social 
security contributions (Agnolucci, 2004:19). 
The Danish tax on the sulphur content of energy products has had a rapid impact since it was 
introduced in 1996. The average sulphur content of fuel oil and coal significantly decreased in 
the same year. Moreover, the tax had a positive impact on the development of sulphur 
purification plants and technology (Danish Ministry of Taxation 1998, 31 in EEA, 2000: 46). 
Sweden 
In Sweden, an energy tax is imposed on most fossil fuels and is independent of energy content, 
whereas a CO2 tax is set on all fuels except biofuel and peat (Government of Sweden, 2004).  
As part of the major tax reform in 1991, Sweden introduced a number of taxes on fossil fuels 
(e.g. diesel oil, petrol), CO2, sulphur, NOx, electricity, domestic air travel, vehicles as well as a 
producer tax on hydroelectric power and on nuclear power. Sweden introduced CO2 tax in 1991. 
The tax was estimated to have reduced CO2 emissions of 5Mt by 1994, which accounts for 9% 
of total Swedish CO2 emissions (Swedish EPA, 1997 in EEA, 2000: 46). In 1992, since other 
EU member states did not follow suit, Sweden reduced the tax by 25% of the normal (i.e. 
households) rate and abolished the energy component. In effect the energy tax burden was 
partly shifted from industry to households. The reduction in the tax rate may have resulted in an 
increase in CO2 emissions by a quarter by 1994 (Carlsson & Hammar, 1996 in EEA, 2000: 46). 
Consequently, the tax rates were doubled for industry in 1997 and further raised in 2001 in the 
framework of a tax shift (i.e. reducing taxes on work). The current CO2 tax amounts to 
approximately €100 per tonne of CO2 (Government of Sweden, 2004: 9). 
Energy-intensive industries may be granted reduced rates (EEA, 2000: 71-72; Schlegelmilch, 
2000: 11). Firms that have used fuels other than petrol and high tax fuels in industrial 
manufacturing processes may apply for a refund of all the energy tax and 79% of the CO2 tax if 
the total amount of the refund exceeds a threshold. Heat producers that have delivered heat for 
use in industrial manufacturing processes or for agricultural, forestry or fish cultivation may 
apply for a refund of all the energy tax and 79% of the CO2 tax on fuels other than petrol and 
high tax fuels as well as the energy tax above a threshold on electricity power that has been used 
to produce heat (Swedish Tax Agency, 2005) (c.f. the European Commission’s assessment over 
several exemptions and reductions from the Swedish energy tax and from the CO2 tax in favour 
of the manufacturing industry and the service sector).
27  
During the same period energy tax rates have been similarly reduced step by step: the Swedish 
energy tax rates have been changed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 (Bygrave & Ellis, 2003: 15, 17; see 
also Table A1). 
                                                      
27 Official Journal of the European Union, “State aid-Sweden, invitation to submit comments pursuant to 
Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, concerning aid C 42/03 (ex NN 3/B/01) – Sweden, Energy Tax Scheme”, 
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The Swedish tax on the sulphur content of coal, peat, motor fuel and heating oil is estimated to 
account for 30% of the total reduction in sulphur emissions from 1989 to 1995, which is 
equivalent to 20% of total emissions in 1995 (Swedish EPA, 1997 in EEA, 2000: 46).  
Taxes on diesel oil and petrol are differentiated according to an environmental classification. 
Evidence shows that the Swedish differential taxation on petrol contributed to the introduction 
of unleaded petrol (Swedish EPA, 1997 in EEA, 2000: 15, 46).  
In addition there is an effective NOx charge scheme set in place since 1992. A charge has been 
imposed on NOx emissions from large stationary combustion plants since 1992, and gradually 
extended to smaller plants since 1996 (EEA, 2000: 48; O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 36; for details 
see ECOTEC, 2001: 53-58). 
The Swedish NOx charge is a pure incentive charge, an exception to the tendency of taxing 
product input, and more importantly is seen as a success case. It is estimated that NOx 
emissions in 1995 would have been 25% greater without the charge (EEA, 2000: 48). The NOx 
charge is based on recorded emissions irrespective of the fuel used and levied at a fixed rate.  
Revenues from NOx charges are returned to the payers in proportion to their share in the total 
net energy production (EEA, 2000: 20, 48, 73; for details, see ECOTEC, 2001: 53-58). The 
Swedish NOx charge scheme allocates net benefits to any producer with emissions lower than 
the average industry per unit of energy consumed and net costs to those with higher emissions 
(O’Brien & Vourc’h, 2001: 36, 38; for details ECOTEC, 2001: 53-58).  
There are no empirical studies that show the effect of carbon taxes on innovation in industry in 
Sweden. An interview study concludes that the current energy tax level did not give enough 
incentives to invest in energy efficient technology in industry (Energidata Göteborg AB et al., 
1995 in Johansson, 2000). However, the tax level has been since then doubled to 50% of the 
general tax level. In contrast some technical developments can be attributed to the introduction 
of the sulphur taxes and nitrogen charges. These charges have led to development of simpler 
and cheaper instruments for emission measurements, calculations and evaluations (e.g. SCNR 
systems for NOx reductions, improvements in existing exhaust gas desulphurisation devices) 
(Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1997 in Johansson, 2000). Amongst others the 
refunding mechanism for the Swedish NOx charge has been effective in facilitating a dynamic 
innovation process (ECOTEC, 2001: xi, 53-58). 
Finland 
The Finnish CO2 tax, which was introduced in 1990, is among the highest in Europe. In 1994 
the CO2 taxation was amended to cover all primary energy sources except wood, wind power 
and waste fuel according to their energy content. In addition a component of the fuel duties 
(‘additional duty’) applied to all fossil fuel according to their carbon and energy content. Since 
1998 the basis for the part of the fuel duties has been only their carbon dioxide content. 
Additional duty on natural gas is 50% lower than the full rate (Agnolucci, 2004). The fuels used 
for power production are tax-free. The CO2 tax rate is kept at a low level.  
The initial input tax on electricity was transformed into a general tax on electricity (output tax 
levied at the consumption level), which means that only the energy content has been taxed since 
1997. Since electricity taxation does not depend on the CO2 content of the fuel used, the 
government designed the tax on electricity produced by wind, wood and wood-based energy to 
be refundable (Agnolucci, 2004). CHP installations are granted a preferential treatment. 
Tax rates have been substantially increased. In addition, tax rates were differentiated across 
sectors (EEA, 2000: 65).  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | 35 
 
The modification of energy tax legislation in 1998 introduced a refund scheme for energy-
intensive firms which have paid more than 3.7% of their value added in energy exercise duties 
as a whole. These firms can apply for a refund of 85% of the tax they paid above the threshold. 
Annually some €15 million is refunded to energy-intensive firms under this scheme (Agnolucci, 
2004: 23).  
Without energy taxation, it was estimated that emissions would have reached 4Mt, which is 
equivalent to 7%, higher than recorded in 1998 (PMOPS, 2000 in EEA, 2000: 47). Most of the 
reduction is attributed to the taxation on transport fuels. It is estimated that changes in industrial 
structure and energy consumption in industry account for a quarter of the reduction. 
Nonetheless the report states that the assessment is uncertain and is likely to indicate the 
maximum reduction level (PMOPS, 2000 in Hildén et al., 2002). Moreover the analysis does 
not take into account the improvements in efficiency that would have occurred without the tax 
or other factors contributing to energy saving and a shift in the use of fuel for energy production 
(Hildén et al., 2002). 
An evaluation study suggests that reduction in the growth rate of energy use on a national level 
can only partly be attributed to the electricity tax. The more plausible factor could be the general 
shift in production structure. It is more likely that the low level of the tax accounts for its 
modest success in environmental effectiveness in the case of industry (Hildén et al., 2002). 
Norway 
Norway taxes CO2 emissions through taxation on gasoline, natural gas, oils and coal. The tax is 
a product tax. CO2 tax was first introduced in 1991. Since 1993 the fuel charges (e.g. mineral 
oil, coal, coke and natural gas) have been based exclusively on the CO2 or SO2 content 
(Agnolucci, 2004). From 1999, CO2 components of several taxes were brought together to make 
up one single CO2 tax (National Statistical Offices in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, 
2003).  
The CO2 tax was expanded in 1999 to include the supply fleet in the North Sea, air transport and 
coastal transport of goods. Ships engaged in foreign trade, processing industry and fisheries are 
exempted from the tax. Natural gas utilised on the mainland as well as coal and choke used in 
the cement are also exempted. In addition Norway has a tax on sulphur in fuels which was 
doubled in 2000. Furthermore the government introduced a CO2 and sulphur tax on aviation 
fuels in 1999. This tax applied to both domestic and international air traffic. Tax on 
international flights was abolished after a few months but the tax on domestic flights remained 
(EEA, 2000: 70; Schlegelmilch, 2000: 10). 
The excise tax on electricity is not differentiated according to the energy sources used in the 
production of electricity (Agnolucci, 2004).   
The Netherlands 
Since the introduction of a fuel tax in 1992, the tax rates are based on the energy content as well 
as the carbon content of the fuels (50% each). An evaluation of the Dutch general fuel tax 
demonstrates that in 1994 CO2 emissions would have been 1.7Mt higher than recorded (EEA, 
2000: 47, 68).  
The ‘regulatory energy tax’ (RET or REB after the Dutch acronym) introduced in 1996 has not 
yet produced measurable impacts. The tax is revenue-neutral. The Netherlands provide both tax 
rebates and a tax limit to large energy users in addition to differentiation of tax rates according 
to the total amount of annual electricity use. The RET/REB scheme exempts large energy users 
from taxation on excess consumption of gas and electricity above a threshold (Box 2 in de Kam, 
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In addition, small energy users are exempt from the regulatory tax with a zero rate band or ‘tax 
floor’ for the initial fixed amount of gas and electricity use. In 2001 these tax-free allowances 
were replaced by a fixed tax reduction of €142 (in 2002) for households connected to the 
electricity network (de Kam, 2002: 25, 28; Sijm, 2003: 10; Sijm & van Dril, 2003: 81-82; EEA, 
2000: 52).  
In 1998 the tax limits for electricity and gas were extended. Meanwhile the tax exemption floor 
remained at the same level.  
All the revenues from RET/REB are fully recycled to the taxpayers on a sectoral basis 
(Agnolucci, 2004). Part of the revenues has been recycled to households through an increase in 
the income tax-free allowance and in the standard deduction for senior citizens, and through 
changes in the taxation on personal income. Part of the revenues has been recycled to the 
business sector through a reduction in the wage component of employers’ payment of 
employees’ social premiums, an increase in the deduction for small independent companies and 
through a decrease in the corporate tax rate. Other recycling measures include accelerated 
depreciation for environmental investments and tax deductions for investments in energy 
efficiency (Agnolucci, 2004). The tax has made investments in energy conservation more 
attractive to firms, providing shorter payback times and promoting the use of renewable energy. 
The tax offers refunds to sectors committing themselves to improve their energy efficiency 
(EEA, 2000: 47, 68-69; Schlegelmilch, 2000: 9; de Kam, 2002: 28). 
The Dutch RET/REB system allows exemptions for natural gas used in CHP installations, heat 
supplied via district heating, and special arrangements for electricity generated from 
renewables, biogas and waste incineration (Agnolucci, 2004). 
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